Collective Negotiation and Labor Relations Governance under "National Dominance"? Strategies and Practices of Indicator Management

2=SimSun Collective Negotiation and Labor Relations Governance under the Leadership of the Family 4 Strategy and Practice of Indicator Management Wu Qingjun asked China's collective bargaining to rely on the state-led model and embarked on a path that is completely different from that of Europe and the United States. The main purpose of the promotion of collective agreement by the State Council is not to promote the game of labor and capital, but to integrate both employers and employees into the framework of the legal system, so that the behavior of both employers and employees can be legalized and contractualized. However, the state regulates labor relations not simply to control, but to achieve governance of the grassroots industrial order through indicator management. Therefore, index management has become the core strategy for the state to promote the construction of collective bargaining system. Local governments and trade unions have called various resources to improve the number of collective contracts around the assessment indicators. In the practice work, the role of the local government’s first party has changed, and the trade union agent The role of the government has also been strengthened. The essence of collective bargaining has changed from a labor-management game to a party-and-government union and a funded party. Since the 1920s, the collective bargaining system has been established as a core system for adjusting labor relations in Europe and the United States. In the past few decades, it has been fully developed. However, after the second century, such as the era, due to the decline of industrial organization and the decline of trade union density, the collective bargaining in Europe and the United States has shown a trend of overall decline and decentralization. The level of the smaller the smear is also getting lower and lower. 1 Lake, 1986; also paid; 1., 2004 is in sharp contrast to this, since 1994, China’s collective bargaining has taken a completely different path under the state-led model, collective contract signing rate and coverage rate. The data released by the National Federation of Trade Unions showed that in 2010, the number of collective contracts signed nationwide reached 1.407 million, covering 2.438 million enterprises, covering the number of employees up to 184.651 million. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions studied the research results of 1008017. . I would like to thank Mr. Guan Binfeng from the National Federation of Trade Unions and Luo Rongbo of the Capital University of Economics and Business for their great help in data collection. He also thanked Professor Xu Xiaojun, Professor Chang Kai, and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable ideas. Responsibility.

If only judged from the data published by the National Federation of Trade Unions, China's collective bargaining system has been greatly developed. However, in practice, the phenomenon of not being willing to talk or not to talk is still very common. This has become the fact that Chang’an is recognized by the government academic circles and even the trade unions. 2009; Cheng Yanyuan, 200420; Xu Xiaohong, 2004, then led by the state. Under the model, how is the number and coverage of collective contracts counted? Why is there such a big contrast between the statistical results and the actual situation? What kind of collective negotiation mode has China chosen, and what forces have promoted the formation and operation of this model? These questions are urgently required to give academic analysis and explanation. This article will combine the province's collective negotiation work practice, and try to explain and analyze the above questions.

Collective bargaining and state-led collective bargaining model Weber's 5 books > 53. They first proposed this concept in the study of the labor cooperation movement in 1.871. But in this study, they did not carry out the concept of collective bargaining. Clearly defined, it is only seen as an institutionalized negotiation relationship between trade unions and employers' or employers' organizations. 1513, 20042001 In the 7 years of economic democracy, Weber and his wife conducted a more in-depth analysis of collective bargaining. 61 133, 1914. In the first part of the book to explain the trade union function, Weber and his wife believed that the trade union needs to promote the large common norm 1610 Yang 1 to maintain the new health of the member health progress, the stability of the new technical work, the right to join the trade union and the right to organize the trade union. At the same time, the common norms can be realized through various ways. The concept of mountain collective bargaining was first appeared in the works of the Weber and his wife, but the practice of collective bargaining has existed in Britain and the United States. Since the 1950s, in the United Kingdom and the United States, Arbitration 1 said that in a broad sense it refers to our collective bargaining work today; and, sometimes, mediation, the heart is also used to refer to collective bargaining work, only then The concept is more widely used, 1956227. The two concepts of arbitration and mediation are quite different from today's meaning. At that time, the arbitration and mediation work was mainly used as a countermeasure for the government to solve the industrial turmoil. It is agreed that the mediation of labor relations under the support of the government was only in the late 19th century. After the implementation of the Trade Union Law 187875 in the United Kingdom, the trade unions gradually got rid of the arbitration under the support of the government, and chose the behavior mode of negotiating directly with the employers in the United States. Similarly, in the early 2nd century, with the rise of the workers' movement and the recognition of the trade unions, the unions made the same choice. , 1228229, mutual aid insurance collective bargaining and legislative recognition, 194,150,276 Here they explained that collective bargaining is a means for trade unions to maintain and improve the living standards of their members.

There is a huge difference between the collective bargaining of trade unions and individual market negotiations. Individual market negotiations lack the exchange of information about work and labor prices. The result of negotiations will only lead to vicious competition among workers, thereby reducing the wage level of workers. But the union can ask the employer for the collective strength of the workers, which can increase the wages of workers and improve working conditions.

Therefore, the biggest advantage of collective bargaining is not only to avoid vicious competition among workers at the enterprise and national levels, but also to protect the rights of individual workers from employers. Although the Webbs still do not clearly define the collective in the democratic world. The concept of negotiation Jia 1 grabs 3 Shi 41999, but Alan. Flanders believes that their discourse provides a very useful guide and foundation for later pluralism, and in their writings also implies that pluralism has an understanding of the nature of collective bargaining. 39 So, in the Weber study On the basis, Flanders believes that the essence of collective bargaining is not the same as bargaining in the market. Collective contracts are not collective bargaining in the true sense. The essence of collective bargaining is the system of wages between employers and employees. The process of exchanging conditions between the rules and the employer in the labor market, the result of the negotiation will form a labor contract; the labor contract determines the terms of exchange between the two parties, and can be used to mediate the conflict of interest between the employer and the employee but the collective contract formed through collective bargaining It only guarantees the realization of the interests of the sellers and sellers of the single labor, but ensures that all the buyers and sellers covered by the contract are bound by the terms of the contract in terms of labor prices and other exchange conditions. Therefore, the collective contract actually becomes the norm for all labor contracts. The substantive rules. In this sense, the essence of collective bargaining is the process of formulating rules. 131845.

Flanders's views basically represent the pluralism's understanding of the nature of collective bargaining. In the writings of John Dunlop and others, similar views have been reached. Dunlop did not separately analyze collective bargaining in the 58-year system of business relations, but He regards collective bargaining, mediation, arbitration and legislation as the process of formulating the rules of the network community 63104. The labor and the government have carried out the strength of the external environment, and finally formed specific procedural rules. Rule 81 Mountain 8111.168 rule network, 9931958220 Dunlop's American labor relations scholars have basically inherited his ideas, although Thomas Kenken made adjustments to Dunlop's views in the 1980s according to the status quo of American industrial relations. That is, in strategic choice 10, collective bargaining is seen as a process of formulating rules at the meso level. , 198024 28; However, in the definition of the nature of collective bargaining, he did not make much change in the view of pluralism. Although it has been largely recognized by the academic circles, there are still many doubts and criticisms. Alan Fox agreed with Flanders's argument, but made a sharp critique of his argument. Fox believes that Flanders basically equates collective bargaining with a collection of individual negotiations. This is a very big mistake. 197515152 Fox specifically criticizes that trade unions on behalf of workers and employers do not equate to individuals in the labor market. The sale and purchase, individual negotiation is the purchase and sale of workers, and the collective bargaining is the negotiation of the power to seek to change the conditions of employment and the environment. First, individual negotiation is an economic process of labor sales, but collective bargaining is not just an economy. The process, at the same time, it is still a political process; first, the final result of collective bargaining will not necessarily reach an agreement, and there may be a result of the breakdown of the negotiations or even strikes. If the result of the agreement is reversed, collective bargaining is a process of formulating rules. Too narrow, collective bargaining should be a relationship between organizations. F0x, 1975154156. In the face of the flaws of Flemish's point of view, the use of collective bargaining by some scholars began to turn to Hugh Clegg's view that collective bargaining is The core process of industrial democracy +, 2.07.84 Clegg in the analysis In the case of industry democracy, the concept of workers' participation, 15;1 30, was considered, and collective bargaining was the core form of workers' participation in enterprise management. It is a review of the Western literature's understanding of the nature of collective bargaining. Can these documents be used to explain the collective of China? Negotiation 2, if not, China's collective bargaining and Europe and the United States I have been advocating their strategic choice model since the 1980s. In this theoretical model, they do not pay attention to the macro industrial relationship structure like Dunlop. Rather, it pays more attention to the analysis of the choice behavior of the labor relations subject at the enterprise level. He generalizes the institutionalized structure of the labor relations at the enterprise level to the macro middle and micro level, and the strategic choice at the middle level is collective bargaining. The macro and micro are the strategic activities and workplace activities, 3 called 1980, over 31. 1986, i in the English literature, in order to distinguish between the collective bargaining of European and American countries and China's collective bargaining, the collective bargaining is translated into Also 0. The International Labour Organization Convention No. 154 of 19:1 on the promotion of collective bargaining The definition is given that article 2 collective bargaining language for the purposes of this Convention includes all of the employer’s employer’s group or one or more employers’ organizations and one or more workers’ organizations for the other party. Negotiation, by 3 to determine working conditions and conditions of employment; and or to adjust the relationship between employers and workers; and or to adjust the relationship between the employer or its organization and the same worker organization or more than one worker organization. This only defines collective bargaining. The subject and negotiation content is a very loose definition. If we define China’s collective bargaining according to this definition standard, China’s collective bargaining also belongs to the ILO’s collective bargaining, but there are differences in collective arrangements with European and American countries. What are the differences between institutional arrangements and practice, and how we should explain them. Obviously, there is a huge difference between the two. Brown pointed out that there are major differences between the two parties. There are differences in the differences of interests and mutual relations between the two parties in the negotiation or negotiation. First, there are differences in the trade unions that represent the interests of workers. First, the negotiation and negotiation of the performance of the physical contract and the law In addition to these differences, the biggest difference between China's collective bargaining and collective bargaining in Europe and the United States comes from the different roles and responsibilities of the state in Europe and the United States. Collective bargaining is a game between employers and employees, just as Beavis. Marbury argues that collective bargaining is essentially the behavior of both employers and employees. Although the actions of both parties are largely influenced by the government, the final decision-making and choice is still between employers and employees. 1965 However, China’s collective bargaining The implementation is a kind of state-led 1999, such as 61 spit, 2, 4; Chang Kai editor, 2009. They believe that in collective bargaining, neither business managers nor trade unions can freely represent the interests of employers or employees. Subject to the direct guidance of the state, the final determination of wages and employment conditions is subject to the guidelines implemented by local governments. Therefore, China’s collective bargaining is the result of the state’s top-down promotion by administrative forces, rather than the result of the bottom-up labor-management game. 1 The academic community agrees with the state-led model of collective bargaining in China, but the purpose of promoting collective bargaining in the country and The essence of collective bargaining is different. Malcolm Werner and others believe that with the disintegration of the unit system and the emergence and development of new economic forms, when the state withdraws from the labor organization, the state will actively promote Collective bargaining. This is mainly based on the consideration of two aspects. The state should carry out macroeconomic regulation and regulation on the wage situation of the labor market. First, the state should fill the vacuum after the government withdraws from the enterprise. All in all, they have reached a common point in several articles, that is, the reason why China introduces a collective bargaining system is not to really promote the negotiation of wages and labor conditions between the employers and employees, but to continue the state’s labor relations with the grassroots. Specification and control 1樵. 51, 1999, here, it should be pointed out that the state leadership is different from state intervention. In Europe and the United States, the state has also intervened in collective bargaining, mainly through legislation to give collective bargaining rights between employers and employees and to establish behavioral norms between employers and employees. For example, in 1935, the Roosevelt Administration of the United States promulgated the Law on Family Labor Relations. The ribs 0186 were for 03 people, giving workers the right to join the trade unions and collective bargaining through trade unions. However, the specific consultations were negotiated between employers and employees. The National Labor Relations Bureau established by this law, 31 613105 8, 3 only plays two roles, confirming the union's power; it deals with improper labor. This is especially true in the UK, where the principle of voluntarism is practiced. The state only plays the role of a system and does not directly participate in collective bargaining.

3,6 However, Simon Clark and others hold different judgments. They believe that the collective bargaining system provides a legal solution to labor conflicts, but the role of collective bargaining in regulating labor relations is very limited. After entering the market economy, the state has carried out large-scale institutional construction in the field of labor relations, that is, the legalization of labor relations and contractual labor disputes. In the article, they introduced the concept of democratic participation, and believed that the state established a collective bargaining system from the top down. The purpose is not only to provide legalization channels to resolve labor-management contradictions, but more importantly to provide legalized systems and norms for the democratic participation of trade unions in corporate affairs.

The views of Werner and Clarke basically represent the top-down state-led model adopted by Western academic circles for the negotiation of China's collective negotiating body. First, the purpose of China's promotion of collective bargaining is not to truly realize labor-management negotiations. For the state-led model, the collective bargaining work since 994 has clearly highlighted the characteristics of this model. But what is the purpose of the state to promote collective bargaining? How does the state-led model achieve this goal in practice? In the top-down state-led model, on. The following is how to interact to promote collective bargaining work. At the national level, how to use national labor management strategies and indicators management. Chinese scholars' research on collective bargaining is mainly focused on two major aspects. Research on collective bargaining system to realize labor rights. 2 is the basis of the idea, from the perspective of jurisprudence to analyze the defects and deficiencies in the labor law and collective contract provisions, in order to promote the collective contract legislation, 1995; Wang Quanxing, 1995; Chang Kai, 2002; Cheng Yanyuan, 20043; Research on the existence of consultation work, under this main focus, focus on the study of the Chinese trade unions. Since the promulgation of the 14-year labor law, the party and the government have made a series of efforts to promote collective bargaining and collective contract systems. Especially in recent years, when the contradiction between labor and capital has become more and more serious, and the number of labor-collective incidents caused by labor-management contradictions has continued to rise, collective bargaining has become the top priority in the work of the government and trade unions to mediate labor-management contradictions and adjust labor relations. Heavy government and trade unions have made great efforts to promote collective bargaining work. In terms of system construction, with the revision of the collective contract provisions of 2004, in the past two years, various localities have successively issued relevant regulations. Right, collective bargaining power and strike power Xiao Hong, 2004; Zheng Qiao, 2003, these two aspects have involved all aspects of the collective bargaining system and practice, but how the collective bargaining model is implemented from the top down, especially How to operate at the national and local levels, there is still little analysis in the existing literature. Therefore, the following will be combined with the collective bargaining system and policies to analyze the practice of the state-led model.

Labor relations governance strategy Werner et al. believe that the implementation of the collective bargaining system in the country is to fill the gap after the government withdraws from the enterprise organization, thus re-controlling the grassroots industrial order. This explanation only shows that the state attaches great importance to collective bargaining work, but if the country So attaching importance to this work, then why is there a formal question in practice? At this point, Werner et al.'s point of view is not convincing. Clark and others believe that the purpose of the state to promote collective bargaining is to provide legalized systems and norms for the democratic participation of trade unions. We believe that this argument is too idealistic. At present, most of the collective contract terms signed by enterprises are similar to the legal provisions, and the legalized clauses are not very operative; and the trade unions are not binding on whether the enterprises can effectively perform the contracts. Then, what is the purpose of the state to promote collective bargaining? We believe that the ultimate goal of the state is to integrate both employers and employees into the framework of a fixed legal system, so that the behavior of both employers and employees can be legalized and contractualized, thus eliminating the contradiction between labor and capital. To maintain a benign operational order in the grassroots industry. In this sense, Werner et al. are not equivalent to simple controls and norms for national purposes. With the increasing marketization of labor relations and the continuous influence of the adjustment of the international environment and industrial structure, the contradictions between labor and capital at the grassroots level have become more and more serious in recent years, and the mass incidents caused by the contradiction between labor and capital have also shown a trend of continuous growth. In order to stabilize and maintain the order of the grassroots industry, the state tried to find an institutional way to resolve the contradiction between labor and capital.

If we only deal with the response measures and measures of sudden incidents, this kind of passive response to the situation will resolve the contradiction between labor and capital. Under the existing institutional framework, the collective bargaining system is a more appropriate choice. Since the establishment of collective bargaining and collective contract work in 14 years, the period of actually promoting this work process is directly related to the peak period of the two labor conflicts. The first time was in the early 2nd century. After more than ten years of market economy, labor relations were in a state of disorderly development, and the contradiction between labor and capital became increasingly prominent. Therefore, in this context, the National Federation of Trade Unions established the Collective Contracts Department, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security revised the collective contract regulations in 2004. The first time after the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007, the number of labor and capital incidents increased, stabilizing labor. Relations, the National Federation of Trade Unions vigorously promote collective bargaining wages and regional industry wage collective bargaining, and local governments have introduced relevant rules and regulations for collective contracts, and vigorously promote collective wage negotiations.

On the other hand, Werner and Clarke did not see the transformation of the state's governance of labor-management contradictions since the beginning of the 21st century. The state wants to legalize and contract the behavior of both employers and employees. It is not a simple control, but a strategy for transforming top-down project management and indicator management. According to Qu Jingdong and others, since entering the new century. The state power has realized the transition from total domination to technical governance, and standardized and technicalized and standardized the rule of law as the core discussion of administrative construction and supervision, thus realizing the transition from operation to governance, etc. Lord, economics has done a lot of research in Zhou Li An, 2, 4; Zhang Yi Gong Liutang, 2005; Wu Ping, 2008; Xu Xianxiang Wang Xianbin, 2010 similar phenomenon exists in the field of labor relations. Indicator management has become the core of collective bargaining work. The National Federation of Labor and Social Security of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and the National Coordinating Labor Relations Conference are referred to as the National Party Meetings 1 and the local governments and trade unions use various strategies to complete the assessment of indicators.

However, in the country's promotion of collective bargaining work, as mentioned by Qu Jingdong and others, the state is more focused on the management of indicators, the implementation of the goal management strategy, the specific techniques and skills for local governments and trade unions to complete indicators. Therefore, there is not much intervention. Therefore, local governments and trade unions can use various strategies and approaches to complete the indicators according to the original intention of collective bargaining within a legal and reasonable scope. Collective bargaining should be a negotiation between the employer and the employee to determine the labor. Remuneration, working hours, rest, vacation, labor safety, health, vocational training, insurance, welfare, etc. However, under the current governance model that only focuses on the results of indicators and does not focus on the completion process, there is often a phenomenon of collective negotiation, which makes collective negotiation not a labor-management game. Becoming an indicator-oriented system for internal assessment and evaluation Local governments and trade unions can call various resources and use various techniques to bargain without urging workers and enterprises to bargain without actually promoting labor. However, as a result of this, collective bargaining has evolved into an intra-institutional interaction between the state and local governments around the assessment of indicators. The national coordination of labor relations parties is composed of the party’s main body, namely the National Federation of Trade Unions’ national human resources and society. The Ministry of Security and the China Enterprise Association of Chinese Entrepreneurs.

Indicator Management In this set of indicator evaluation system, the National Federation of Trade Unions and the National Party Conference promoted collective bargaining through control indicators, which fully reflects the kind of incentives for the state of labor relations and grassroots work in the new century. In this interaction, the number of collective contracts and the expansion of coverage have become the hallmarks for promoting collective bargaining. Collective bargaining is not a negotiation between employers and employees, but has become a game between local party and government unions and enterprises.

Strategic indicators at the national level From the work practice of the National Federation of Trade Unions in recent years, we can clearly see the two working ideas for promoting collective bargaining. On the face of it, the highest goal of full contract coverage is adopted, and the way of exercising is adopted. Collective consultation work is being carried out throughout the country; it, at the point of view, summarizes typical local experiences and promotes them nationwide. In order to achieve the goal of full-scale collective consultation, in the past two years, the National Federation of Human Resources and Social Security National Federation of Trade Unions and the National Conference have formulated a number of strategic arrangements. For example, the National Conference was issued in 2010, and the work plan for the implementation of the Rainbow Project in the collective contract system was further promoted. In 20 years, the National Federation of Trade Unions proposed two generalizations and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions issued in 201. Collective consultation work planning, etc.

In these strategic deployments, the National Federation of Trade Unions of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and the National Conference set the tone for collective bargaining at the national level, and proposed the highest goals, for example, in the implementation of the Rainbow Plan for the implementation of the collective contract system. The work plan stipulates that from 2010 to 2012, we will strive to implement a collective contract system in all types of established trade union enterprises in three years; among them, the coverage rate of the collective contract system in 2010 will reach 60 or more, and in 201, it will reach 80 or more in China. The two universally set goals set by the 10th Executive Committee of the General Labor Union are to strive to implement collective wage negotiations in all types of established trade unions in accordance with the law in 2012. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions in 202013 to deepen the wage collective bargaining work plan set the goal is to use three years from 20 years, by the end of 2013, the establishment of trade unions organized enterprises more than 80 to establish a collective wage negotiation system, the basic realization of established trade union enterprises Carry out wage collective bargaining, in which the establishment of a wage collective bargaining system for all Fortune 500 companies in China, setting clear strategic goals at the national level is a very useful indicator for guiding the promotion of national work. For example, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions promoted collective wage negotiations in 20203. The work plan stipulates that the collective wage negotiation rate of enterprises that have established trade unions by the end of 20 will reach 60, reaching 70 at the end of 2012 and reaching 80 at the end of 2013. Although these indicators are very clear, they use digital indicators to guide the collective bargaining work in the country, paying attention to It is only the quantity and coverage of collective contracts. There is no clear goal for the quality of contracts. Therefore, indicators that only focus on coverage tend to evolve into difficult-to-substantial work, and the slogan becomes the national trade union system. The target of action may eventually become a field Assessment of the data.

Indicators issued at the national level may fall into the dilemma of digital games, but the indicator management reflects a new shift in the state's governance of labor relations technology. This new transformation is reflected in two aspects. The index management makes the country have a simpler and clearer assessment standard for local work performance, from simple control of grassroots labor relations to local indicators, while the state only emphasizes target assessment. It also leaves a huge room for local work, which can stimulate local governments and trade unions to use various strategies to complete the indicators. First, the country has set priorities and directions for local work by setting indicators. In the relevant policies and documents promulgated by the state since 2008, the focus and difficulty of collective bargaining are concentrated in foreign-funded enterprises and small and medium-sized non-public enterprises. The most serious conflicts are also the weakest areas of trade union work. Therefore, the indicators set by the state are directed to these two areas, reflecting the basic thinking of the state on the governance of labor relations. For example, in the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 20 2013 In the plan of promoting wage collective bargaining work, the current work priorities are put forward, that is, collectively negotiate the regional industry wages, do a good job in the construction of the collective bargaining system for non-public enterprises, and do a good job in the establishment of the world top 500 enterprises in China. The small and medium-sized non-public enterprises, while the latter are placed in foreign-funded enterprises. In these two areas, the trade unions are relatively weak, and collective bargaining work is more difficult to promote, especially in foreign-funded enterprises. In the specific target tasks, special emphasis is also placed on the collective negotiation of foreign-funded enterprises.

At the local level and at the local level, there are also differences in the implementation indicators at the local level in the specific practice work. National-level indicators are more like strategic goals, and when they are transmitted to the localities, they become political tasks. In addition to the relevant supporting implementation plans, local governments and trade unions must set hard-acting indicators that are consistent with national-level goals. In the 1 province of the team survey, in each year in June, the Provincial Federation of Trade Unions Human Resources and Social Security Department, the Provincial State-owned Assets and Resources Commission, the Provincial Federation of Industry and Commerce, and the Provincial Enterprise Confederation, shall jointly carry out the joint wage negotiations for 100-day operations jointly issued by the department in 20 years. In the implementation plan of the 100-day action plan for wage collective bargaining in the province, the hard indicators are clearly defined. Before the end of June 20, more than 85 enterprises in various regions will establish a collective bargaining system for wages, and China’s and its holding companies will develop the world’s top 500 investment enterprises. The enterprises above designated size in the industrial parks of the district have basically achieved full coverage and have also formulated three hundred plans, namely, implementing the collective offer plan of 100 well-known state-owned enterprises, implementing the plan for 100 foreign-funded enterprises, and implementing the plans for 100 well-known private enterprises. After the Provincial Federation of Trade Unions and other departments issued the collective bargaining indicators for wages, all urban and county counties also forwarded and issued corresponding implementation indicators, and implemented them at various levels. The collective bargaining indicators of wages became necessary for all levels of government and trade unions to complete. In addition, in 1 province, Collective bargaining for wages has also been included in the party and government assessment indicators system at all levels.

In June of the 20th, the first provincial and provincial government offices issued the letter, and promoted the collective wage negotiation work. In this intention, collective wage negotiation was included in the party and government performance evaluation system, that is, the government at or above the county level should include the wage collective negotiation rate and the wage growth rate of employees in the target assessment of each district, city, county, government and relevant departments. In the indicator system, the provincial coordination labor relations party is responsible for issuing assessment targets and implementing assessments for each district, city and relevant departments. Under such a political mission, wage collective bargaining is not only the work of trade unions, but also the task of governments at all levels; the collective bargaining between the government and trade unions is not only to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of workers, but also to governments at all levels. Assessment of work. The province is not a special case. From January to July of the 20th year, 15 provinces across the country have included collective wage negotiation into the government's target evaluation system. From strategic indicators to political tasks, from labor-to-business games to government performance evaluation indicators, these are fully explained. The transformation of state-management labor relations technology and strategy has become a government assessment indicator, and the completion of indicators is directly linked to the promotion of government and trade union leaders. The implementation of index management by the state not only sets the assessment criteria for local governments and trade unions, but also sets incentive mechanisms for local governments and trade unions to coordinate grassroots labor relations. Local governments and trade unions are only emphasized when the state only emphasizes target management. It will create various ways in practical work, and call various resources to complete or even exceed the indicators to complete the indicator strategy and formal dilemma. Under the new model of state governance labor relations, the number of collective contracts and coverage have been straight in recent years. As for the rising trend, as far as the province is concerned, only the special collective contract for wages, as of October 20, the province signed 46,000 collective wage contracts, covering 75,000 enterprises, covering 6.86 million employees, in the provincial capital city. 3 cities, as of September 20, the city has established 123 collective wage negotiation systems, the establishment rate reached 94, covering 940,000 employees; signed 29 industry wage agreements, covering 1685 enterprises; only 20 years The number of enterprises covered by the industry wage agreement has increased by 712, with 35,000 new employees. Such high data naturally reflects the joint efforts of local party and government trade unions to promote collective bargaining and wage collective bargaining. How do you complete these indicators at the local level? What are the questions behind the completion of indicators? In the survey, we found that local governments and trade unions used a variety of strategies around the assessment indicators in practice. If it is said in the image, it uses the non-institutional supervision and supervision of soft and hard, and the smuggling of the column. The method of stealing the column refers to expanding the regional or industry collective negotiation as much as possible while expanding the difficulties of collective bargaining. Regional or industry collective contracts to expand the coverage of contracts.

Institutionalized offer action unions offer collective bargaining agreements to enterprises. This is the right granted by the law to the trade unions, and the trade union law, the labor contract law, and the collective contract provisions. However, in the case of a company refusing to do so, the current laws and regulations do not give the union the appropriate means and operational methods, nevertheless, as a means.

In the province only, in addition to making an offer to the company in daily work, the trade union will also carry out the action of the collective wage negotiation in March every year, while promoting the action of the offer. And require all localities to combine the actual situation and the way of innovative offer through the combination of the enterprise initiative offer and the trade union offer, the grassroots trade union offer and the superior trade union offer, the collective offer and the individual offer, the trade union offer and the regional industry offer are connected. Multi-level and multi-form negotiation offer. Finally, the formation of the grassroots trade unions in the province took the initiative to invite the enterprises to actively respond to the higher-level trade unions to propose the rectification of the human resources and social security departments for the law enforcement inspection of the tender work chain.

The offer action has a definite effect on urging the company to sign the contract and sign the wage collective contract. The enterprise faces not only the offer of the enterprise trade union, but the offer from the higher-level trade unions to join the government. In the province, the provincial labor union and the provincial human resources and social security department have also established a reconciliation system. Enterprises that refuse to refuse to conduct collective wage negotiations according to law shall be supervised and enforced, and the investigation and handling of the offer shall become a work promoted by the external joint forces of the enterprise, and not the negotiation between the employers and employees within the enterprise. This kind of external strength of the enterprise to promote the offer has become a common pattern in the province. For example, in the year of the 3rd, the city’s trade union government and the enterprise association united together to organize a large-scale collective offer for more than 300 municipal enterprises directly. The city has also formulated a pilot method for collective bargaining for agency wages, which clearly stipulates that the higher-level trade unions carry out the offer agency under the supervision of the external forces of the enterprise. As long as the collective contract does not affect the normal operation and benefits of the enterprise, most enterprises will make an appointment and sign the collective. contract.

Non-institutionalized supervision and law enforcement is included in the task indicators of the government's performance appraisal system. The work of promoting collective bargaining is no longer just a task of the trade unions, but a task that the government and the trade unions need to accomplish. In the case that union power cannot promote work, trade unions can unite with the government to advance.除了上述正式制度化的要约行动之外,在实践中,各地还出现了些非制度化的做法在省,我们看到了两种做法是自上而下的党政工会联合领导与督促。 20年1月,省委专门发文,成立了由省委副书记任组长15个行政单位负责人为成员的领导小组,同时制定了各成员单位的责任分工。全省个设区市和大部分县也都成立了由党政领导任组长关于建立乡镇街道工资集体协商指导小组的意在这份意指导下,全省2219个乡镇街道普遍建立了由党委负责人或工会主席任组长,由乡镇街道工会人保工商司法税务财政企业代借助方机制的职能,采取联合发动部署联合组织实施联合督导检查联合彰奖励等措施,协助推进工资集体协商工作=由此,省形成了自上而下党政主导各方行政力量相互配合的工作格局。

是借助执法监察之名推动集体协商完成集体协商是党政和工会的项硬性指标,所以,工会可以在工作中借助行政部门的力量,在行政执法的名义下督促拒不应约拒不开展集体协商的企业。当然,目前在法律上并未对拒不签约企业的处罚进行明确规定,但实践中,工会可以联合行政部门的力量,以其他名义督促企业签约,例如,工会往往借助劳动监察卫生监察安全检查以及税收经营检查等名义进行执法检查,目的并不在于执法检查结果,而是督促企业尽快进行集体协商应约并签订集体合同在访谈中,省总工会位负责人这样述企业坚持不应约,目前工会在法律上是没有太多办法的。但是,我们工作中办法多的是,只要随便用个法子就能让他们来谈。你比方说,我们可以进工厂查他们的用工情况,说有职工举报企业用工不合法,实际上也不是真要查,就是起到敲山震虎的作用。去了之后,企业也知道怎么回事,有些企业也不太敢惹事,说我们马上开展工资集体协商。只要他答应了,我们就算了。办法多的是,可以借税务工商的办法,去查他们是否偷税漏税,哪家企业经得起查啊,只要你去查,最后都能签集体合同以1012扩大区域性和行业性集体协商正式的要约行动和非正式的监察执法督促,并不能完全促使所有的企业进行集体协商对于正式的要约行动,仍然有很多企业不予理会,例如8市在20年要约行动中向77家市百强企业和14家市领导联系的重点企业,发出了工资集体协商敦促函,但结果仅有不到半的企业给予了回函非正式的监察执法督促又会影响政府工会与企业的关系,针对那些坚持拒不应约的企业,政府和工会在工作推进中也存有顾虑所以,在企业集体协商工作推进存在巨大困难的情况下,些地方开始采用签订区域性或行业性集体协商的方式来扩大合同覆盖面在此背景下,我们看到近年来区域性和行业性集体合同的数量呈现急剧上升的趋势根据全国总工会的统计,2,6年,全国签订区域性集体合同6.6万份,覆盖企业75.3万个,覆盖职工2958.5万人;行业性集体合同1.9万份,覆盖企业17.2万个,覆盖职工1287.0万人到了2010年,全国签订区域性集体合同8.1万份,覆盖企业8万个,覆盖职工4537.7万人;行业性集体合同13.0万份,覆盖企业39.3万个,覆盖职工2276.4万人。区域性和行业性集体合同的签订率增速要远远超过工资专项集体合同从这些数字可以看出,签订区域性和行业性集体合同是扩大集体合同覆盖面最为直接且便捷的补充,通过此类做法,覆盖企业数量和职工数量都迅速扩大,从而有效地保证完成了集体合同的签订指标。

综上所述,通过软硬兼施和偷梁换柱的办法,集体合同数量和覆盖率近5年来都增长了倍多,在这持续攀升的数字背后,隐含着集体协商和集体合同正进行着场围绕指标考核的体制内运动为完成指标考核,不仅仅是工会,地方党政各个部门也都卷入了这场运动之中,形成了党政主导各部门参与工会运作的工作格局,形式化的困境地方层面使用各种策略来完成指标考核,但在巨额数量的集体合同背后,大部分地区普遍存在着集体协商形式化的困境。具体来说,现在个方面,即有协商但无博弈,有合同但合同法条化,重合同签订但轻合同履行。

按照集体合同规定,集体合同必须经由用人单位和职工进行博弈协商之后再行确定。但是,在调查中我们发现,企业在协商过程中力量过于强大,在工资和福利待遇等方面大多由企业单方决定,而企业工会作为职工代力量较为薄弱,在协商中无法与企业进行有效博弈。双方处于力量不均衡的平台上,协商的过程就很难形成博弈的局面。无博弈的协商过程导致的结果是,签订集体合同类似于走过场,涉及职工权益的相关事项大多由企业单方决定。

无博弈的现象不仅体现在企业层面,在区域性和行业性的集体协商中体现得更为明显在区域性和行业性集体协商中,不仅企业工会缺乏有力的博弈力量,甚至连大部分企业都未参与协商过程在推动区域性和行业性集体合同的工作中,区域性集体合同由地方工会与企业代组织签订,行业性集体合同则由行业工会或地方工会与企业代组织签订。在调查中发现存在的普遍问是,企业代组织很少组织所代的企业进行内部协商,在签订合同中,也未能真正与工会进①集体合同规定第条本规定所称集体合同,是指用人单位与本单位职工根据法律法规规章的规定,就劳动报酬工作时间休息休假劳动安全卫生职业培训保险福利等事项,通过集体协商签订的书面协议行协商与博弈省总工会主管集体合同的领导在访谈中说在协商过程中,我们也发现了下面些问首先,很多集体协商仍然存在有合同无协商无博弈过程的问在为了完成上级下的集体合同指标的情况下,有的工会干部为了完成任务,就签订行业集体合同,在个行业中通过找个行业企业代来代所有企业签订工资集体协商合同,但是这个代能不能代所有不定都能够都愿意相信代实施工资集体谈判。另个方面来讲,个协商如果是没有博弈没有争论,这肯定不会是个好协议,协商代本身就是个利益分配的协商,是涉及到个人利益意味着协议并没有触及到协商的实质,达不到实质效果。

2.法条化的集体合同文本集体合同在无博弈的情况下签订,导致的结果是大部分合同条款存在着法条化的现象在调查中我们发现,在,省,不论是企业层级的集体合同,还是区域性或行业性集体合同,绝大部分用的都是上级工会下发的集体合同样本在合同形式以及具体条款上,大量照搬照抄法律法规,很少有按照企业或区域行业的特殊性进行细化的条款这种照搬法律条文的合同文本虽然在内容上不违法,但在履行中却存在着很大问方面,合同条款难以操作,法律规章制度都是原则性条款,只有结合了企业具体实情的条款才便于操作和细化;另方面,合同条款使用的是最低劳工标准,如果集体合同也同样使用最低劳工标准,那么就失去了集体协商的本来意,违背了集体协商的宗旨1省总工会也非常清晰地认识到了这问,但就目前的情况来看,这种局面仍然难以改观。省总工会主管集体合同的领导对此问,最低劳工标准是法定的最低用工标准,旦低于最低标准则属于违法,这些条款由法律法规界定而无需协商,只有高于法定最低标准才需要集体协商。

我们现在的情况是有合同无硬件,在检查集体合同时,我们发现了有的合同里面就是简单摘抄法律条文,都是些劳动法律规定,说明基础工作还很薄弱。在我们检查个小企业的集体合同中,还出现了工资按照法定货币支付这样的内容,这完全是摘抄的法律原文,连这么明显的地方都没有改正过来我当时就批评他们,这是连抄都不会抄啊!现在工资集体协商是定不能走集体合同的老路了,要做到细化量化硬化,要细化到岗位计件的计算方法,做好劳动定额的计算方法,标准是基础。这些都是最薄弱的点,目前要改变还是很困难的,1软约束的合同履行目前集体协商工作虽有党政的高度重视,但是,党政和工会的主要精力都集中在签订集体合同阶段,对集体合同的履行,目前既缺乏相应劳资双方行为的契约,应该在实践中得以履行,否则契约将变成纸空文。在省我们了解到,在上级政府和工会的大力推动下,企业虽然签订了集体合同,但是上级政府和工会既无精力又无制度化的规范来督促每个企业履行合同,所以只能依靠有限的几次检查来督促企业,因而呈现出种软约束的情况。1省建立了督导检查制度,即把每年月定位为全省定期督导检查月,由省厅级领导干部带队,对各地工资集体协商情况进行督导检查,这样有限的几次检查并不能变成曰常工作的监督和督促,在定程度上很难约束企业的行为在整个集体协商工作格局当中,出现了重签订轻履行的局面。省总工会主管集体合同的领导在访谈中这样概括目前集体合同实施效果的具体情况现阶段工资集体协商发挥的作用还不够理想,没有真正达到剩余价值共享的目的。现阶段制定工资的主体,仍然是老板而不是集体,没有充分体现到职工利益,在企业中,职工素质不高,工会主席的地位也比较尴尬,而老板的地位,层次比较好,有很好的意达途径,可以向上级领导进行游说,但是职工文化水平有限,也没有意达的途径,职工和老板所能够获得的信息也不对称,导致整个工作推进起来比较复杂,而职工却看不到这些,当看到工会工作没有明显进展的时候,就会出现不知道不理解,不买账的情况。爪0823综合来看,集体协商工作呈现出对矛盾,即方面党政领导高度重视,并且成为了政府考核指标体系中的部分;而另方面,集体协商又普遍出现形式化的问,导致的结果是有签订而博弈,有合同而无履行的局面如果我们进步分析,这对矛盾实际上在现实工作中却并不矛盾地方党政高度重视集体协商工作,重视的是签订集体合同的数量,而并非要促使劳资双方进行真正的博弈;重视的是集体合同的覆盖范围,而并非是集体合同实施的效果签订集体合同完成指标考核是整个地方党政和工会推进集体协商工作的核心,衡量集体协商工作的标准也并非合同的执行效果,而是完成数量和覆盖面的指标。

集体协商谁的博弈,沃尔顿和麦克西在20世纪60年代中期把欧美国家的主要集体谈判方式界定为种分配式谈判此,叫整合式谈判,1此呀31厂增态度的构架。出341啦1塔和组织内谈判1.0啊1士313尽3.如,5,他们对欧美国家谈判方式的概括得到了学界的普遍认可,那么我们是否也可以用这种谈判模式来解释和分析中国的集体协商模式呢,答案是否定的。

沃尔顿和麦克西的种谈判方式的背后隐含了两个基本前提,即第,在集体谈判中政府工会和企业各方的角色是非常明确的,政府是规则制定者,工会和资方是博弈主体;第,谈判的目标是明确的,即要对工资和劳动条件达成协议。但是,中国集体协商模式在这两个问中,政府的角色不仅是规则的制定者,还变成了真正的博弈主体,工会谈判的主要目标不仅是要确定工资和劳动条件,更主要的是要提高签订合同的数量和扩大覆盖面。所以要分析中国国家主导的模式,就有必要分析政府和工会的角色社会学研究政府第方角色的转变在欧美国家的集体谈判中,尽管政府介入的程度存在差异但是政府作为第方的角色是相同的。政府第方角色主要体现在第,政府是集体谈判制度和规则的制定者,政府通过法律法规的形式介入集体谈判第,政府是劳资纠纷的调停者和仲裁者,虽然在些国家存在着定的差异,但大多数国家都规定当集体谈判出现争议的情况下,政府可以通过第方的身份介入与欧美国家不同的是,中国政府在集体协商中不仅扮演第方的角色,而且还直接参与整个协商过程当中,并成为整个协间过程的主导,在1动法及集体合同规定等法律法规中,政府被赋予的仍然还是第方的角色,这种角色和身份与欧美国家相差无几但是,在党政主导各方参与工会运作的工作模式中,政府方面扮演第方的角色,制定集体协商的制度与规则;另方面,在签订集体合同和扩大覆盖面工作上,政府作为主导者,直接成为与资方博弈的主体所以在中国,集体协商虽然在法律上仍然被界定为劳资协商,但在具体工作中则成为了党政联合工会与资方的博弈政府角色的这种转变主要体现在两大方面。

第,政府直接成为集体协商工作的主导党政主导的工作模为了主导的角色。在现有的法律法规中,当企业拒绝集体协商应约的情况下,工会并无明确的程序和规则要求企业应约,只能求助于政府,但法律法规又没有明确规定政府处理的具体程序和规则,集体合同规定第十六条规定用人单位无正当理由拒绝工会或者职工代提出的集体协商要求的,按照工会法及有关法律法规的规定处理,但是,在2001年修订的江会法第十条中规定违反本法规定,有下列情形之的,由县级以上人民政府责令改正,依法处理无正当理由拒绝进行平等协商的虽然在此条款中规定了政府的职责,但是对如何具体进行操作并未做出明确规定,所以目前有些地方出台的相关集体合同的规章制度规定用罚款的形式进行处理党政主导的工作模式试通过党政的力量来弥补这种制度上的缺陷,督促企业应约,并签订集体合同旦企业拒绝应约和签订集体合同,集体协商就演变成了地方政府和企业之间的博弈第,多个政府部门直接参与集体合同的签订工作。在工会法和集体合同规定中,仅有劳动行政部门作为政府的代参与集体协商的监督和审查工作。例如集体合同规定第七条规定县级以上动保障行政部门对本行政区域内用人单位和本单位职工开展集体协商签订履行集体合同的情况进行监督,并负责审查集体合同或专项集体合同。但是近年来,这种工作局面发生了转变,不仅劳动行政部门参与集体协商工作,而且多达十多个政府部门直接参与督促企业签订集体合同的工作。2,年国家人力资源和社会保障部发布的关于深入推进集体合同制度实施彩虹计划的通知中规定要在当地党委政府领导下,建立由人力资源社会保障部门主要领导牵头,协调劳动关系方主管领导具体负责,有关职能部门参加的工作协调领导机构,形成政府部门主导方协同多方支持企业和职工积极参与的工作机制除了方之外多方支持主要指各级相应的政府部门都要参与督促集体合同的签订工作,在地方层面上,我们所调查的省在20年1月由省委专门发文,成立了由省委副书记任组长5个行政单位负责人为成员的领导小组,并制定了各个成员单位的责任分工这15个单位基本涵盖了大部分相关行政机构,包括工商税务财政司法监察以及安检等行政部门,多个行政部门的直接参与加强了政府直接介入集体协商的力度。

从以上两个方面来看,政府在集体协商工作中就不再是第方工会双重代理的角色中国工会既具有国家属性又具有社团属性,这点已成为学界的共识陈佩华,2001;陈峰,2003.工会的双重属性在集体协商工作中体现得尤其明显,它既要代政府的利益,同时又要体现出作为职工代的角色,扮演的是双重代理角色。,工会作为职工代的角色是法律法规赋予的工会法劳动法以及集体合同规定都有明确规定这种法定角色直没有发生改变,只不过在党政主导各方参与工会运作的工作模式中,工会直接参与集体协商的层级越来越高。在江会法〉〉劳动法以及集体合同规定中,规定的协商层级都仅限于企业层级,但近两年来除了企业层面之外,区域和行业层级也成为了工会工作的重点,要求企业之上的工会直接参与其中另方面,在企业层级集体协商工作难以取得进展的情况下以上代下上级工会只有指导职责,例如工会法第十条规定工会签订集体合同,上级工会应该给予支持和帮助。但是,在党政主导的工作模动和创新的要约机制,都体现出以上代下的特征目前上级工会已不再仅仅支持和帮助企业层级的协商,而且要履行直接参与集体协商的职责〃与此同时,工会又成为党政的代理者角色例如,在集体协商工作中出现劳资冲突时,工会以第方的角色介入调解,并且在党政主导各方参与工会运作的工作模式中,工会代理政府的角色得到了强化。在以往的集体协商工作中,工会仅凭自身的力量来推动集体协商,但是在党政主导的工作模式中,随着党政对整个集体协商的工作承担主导职责,且多个政府部门直接参与,工会就可以借用政府部门的行政力量来推动集体协商工作。所谓工会运作,运作的是政府的权力与力量,从中体现出工会代理政府角色得到了强化。工会针对拒绝协商应约或拒绝签订集体合同的企业,可以通过劳动司法税务工商以及安全等部门协助进行处理如果说以上代下的模式解决的是目前企业工会在集体协商中缺乏独立性的难,那么,强化工会代理政府的角色就是要解决上级工会缺乏行政执法权的困境。工会作为社团组织,并不拥有行政执法权力,所以在面对企业拒绝应约或签订集体合同的情况下,工会缺乏相应的应对手段。但是在多个政府部门的直接参与下,工会就可以凭借行政力量与企业进行博弈,在这过程中,工会的力量得到大幅增强,同时,工会行政化色彩也得到了强化综合上述分析,我们认为,当前的集体协商已不再仅是劳资博弈,而演变成了党政联合工会与资方的博弈。政府第方角色的转变以及工会代理政府角色的强化,实际上都说明目前主导推动集体协商工作的是行政力量,而并非是来自职工的组织主体力量,在这场推动签订集体合同与扩大覆盖面的工作中,职工直都是被参与的主体。尽管法律法规明确规定,职工是集体协商的主体,但是,党政和工会并未完全发动和组织职工的力量,而是主要依靠行政力量与资方进行博弈六结语与讨论集体协商是国家治理劳动关系技术的个重要组成部分,当国家面对矛盾突出的劳动关系时,试通过指标化管理把劳资双方行为都纳入到法制化和契约化的道路上来但是,在这套治理技术中,国家过于强调目标管理,而对实现目标的过程与途径未加以重视因此导致了个矛盾现象,即方面集体协商工作越来越受政府和工会重视,而另方面集体协商形式化问依然严重。

当集体协间工作成了地方政府的绩效考核指标时,完成指标就与政绩和领导人的升迁直接挂钩。在此背景下,地方政府和工会必然会结合当地的实际情况,充分调用切资源来完成指标在完成指标的过程中,地方政府和工会想尽办法使用各种各样的策略,但并不会去促动劳资双方进行真正的博弈。之所以如此,主要由于地方政府和工会存在两方面的担心其,推动劳资双方博弈势必会提高企业用工成本,影响投资环境,导致地方经济受损;其,劳资双方博弈可能会带来无法预知的后果,即旦谈判破裂可能会带来劳资之间的剧烈冲突,地方政府和工会都没有充分的把握能够控制局面,其结果可能是导致基层产业秩序更为混乱,政府和工会掌控的难度也自然会加大地方政府和工会综合各方面因素考虑,在既要维持当地的稳定和发展,同时又要完成指标任务的目标下,才会使用上述策略来完成指标任务。所以,在这场自上而下依靠行政力量推动的工作中,集体协商的核心目标并非是要确定工资和劳动条件,更为主要的是要提高集体合同的签订数量和扩大合同的覆盖面。对于地方政府和工会来说,这是两全其美的策略,既完成了指标,又不会对地方经济和社会稳定带来影响但是,这些策略的使用却偏离了集体协商的本质要想解决这问,根源可能还在于国家治理技术的转变。

常凯主编,20以中国劳动关系报告当代中国劳动关系的特点和趋向,北京中国劳动社会保障出版社。

陈峰,2.在国家和劳工之间市场经济下中国工会的角色冲突,香港中文大学中国研究程延园,200如集体谈判制度研究,北京中国人民大学出版社。

徐小洪,2004中国工会的主体性分析,香港中文大学中国研究服务中心网站1!叫〃郑桥003劳资谈判,北京中国工人出版社。

中华全国总工会研究室,20工会组织和工会工作发展状况统计公报2006责任编辑闻翔

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